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Abstract - As educators, we would like to believe that we 
can influence the ethical growth of our students.  If we 
are to do this, it seems worthwhile to first understand 
what ethical decision-making is and how it happens.  For 
millennia, ethical decision-making has fallen within the 
domain of philosophy. However, recent evidence 
suggests that the average person does not consider 
ethical dilemmas in the abstract. Instead, ethical 
decision-making appears to be a complex dance between 
an individual’s rational calculus of the ethical dilemma 
and their emotional response to the context of the 
dilemma. I will present an argument that in the trenches
of daily life, psychology has a better grasp on the 
workings of ethical decision-making, while philosophy
helps to provide direction.  I will also present a number
of historical and current psychological theories about
ethical decision-making, from behaviorist to post-
modern feminist.  Throughout this discussion I will build
on a psychological framework for ethical decision-
making and moral development, and present 
implications for engineering education. 
Index Terms – Ethics, philosophy, psychology. 
One of the most fundamental and universal aspects of being 
human, is seeking knowledge of what it means to be human
– specifically a ‘good’ human.  In this paper, I hope to 
engage in a discussion of the historical debate between the 
philosophical and psychological perspectives of human 
morality and moral growth.  In doing so, I will borrow 
heavily from the work of Darcia Narvaez [1,2,3], a leading 
moral development theorist.  It is my intent to provide the 
reader with a brief synopsis of contemporary work in moral
development, and through this new research, to challenge
the current paradigm in engineering education and propose a 
new way of thinking about engineering ethics education.
IN THE BEGINNING: EARLY PHILOSOPHY AND CHARACTER
EDUCATION
Morality is an inherent aspect of all human beings that is 
simultaneously necessary to maintain a functioning social 
system and an integral part of an individual’s process of self-
realization [4]. In Western societies our ideas about 
morality are most heavily influenced by the philosophical
traditions passed down to us by the ancient Greeks.  The
Greeks emphasized the improvement of the self (as opposed
to the elimination of the self in Eastern traditions) and 
knowledge of the Good.  Aristotle is among those that have 
most deeply influenced modern thought on morality and 
character development.  Aristotle, however, took a more 
pragmatic, contextualized view, believing that all humans 
sought to develop into happy and flourishing beings [4]. 
Aristotle’s theory of human flourishing contains two
fundamental aspects: first, that all humans ought to live in
conformity to reason, and second, that humans develop
character through the formation of habits.  Though there has 
been considerable debate on the subject of reason in his 
writings, Aristotle believed that moral reasoning involved 
merging contextual information with practical wisdom to 
arrive at moral decisions. 
However, it is the second aspect of the Aristotelian theory of
virtue that has gained the most attention, particularly within
the character education movement.  Here scholars saw 
Aristotle’s description of habituation as a form of learning
through non-cognitive processes – through repetition of 
virtuous acts.  We shall see later that Aristotle may have
meant something entirely different. 
Early character education in the United States can be traced 
directly back to 18th century practice in Great Britain and
medieval Christian morality (e.g. Aquinas), both of which 
are direct descendents of the Aristotelian idea of virtue 
formation through habituation.  By the late 19th century, 
character education had begun to move away from its
Christian roots; however, it was overwhelmingly the 
dominant form of moral education in both public and private 
schools.  This would change dramatically with the 
publication of The Character Education Enquiry in 1930, 
the first major study on the role of character education in the 
U.S. by Hartshorne and May [5].  This landmark study
showed that traditional methods failed to produce a link 
between character training and moral behavior, and that
moral behavior appeared to be situational, not virtue-based. 
It provided the empirical evidence needed to challenge 
traditional and behaviorist approaches to moral education. 
The horrors of the Holocaust, perpetrated within a nation 
that espoused strong character education, would 
subsequently provide much of the motivation to create a new 
theory of moral development.
A DIFFERENT OUTLOOK: THE DEVELOPMENTAL 

COGNITIVE REVOLUTION
 
The Enlightenment saw a resurgence of philosophical 
progress led most notably by the likes of John Locke, David 
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Hume, and of particular importance for our discussion, 
Immanuel Kant.  Kant took a dramatically different position
from that of the character development tradition.  He 
approached human development not as one dictated by a 
broader telos or even one crafted by experience or exposure 
to moral exemplars, but rather development that arose out of 
personal autonomy.  Kant believed that individuals attain
true moral perfection when they act in accordance with 
moral rules that they themselves created and are self-
imposed.  This led Kant to develop the notion of the
Categorical Imperative as a rational means of crafting the
moral rules by which an individual was to govern their own 
actions.
In one of the truly revolutionary moments in modern
psychology, Lawrence Kohlberg would combine Kant’s
deontological (or duty driven) philosophy with the new
cognitive developmental approach of Jean Piaget to create 
his now famous stage analysis of cognitive moral 
development.  Kohlberg divested from contemporary
thinking that it was society that determined what was
morally right and wrong. Instead, he believed fervently in
the Kantian mold that it was the individual who constructed 
their own knowledge of the good.  He went a step further
than Kant, however, by arguing that individuals are not born
with advanced moral judgment capability, but rather 
advance along a common sequence of developmental stages
based on acquired cognitive skills and processes. 
Kohlberg had successfully married the Kantian notion of the
individual construction of morality and the Piagetian notion 
of cognitive development from early childhood to adulthood. 
His theory was as much an affirmation of Kant’s philosophy
as it was a rejection of the Aristotelian approach taken by
character education.  Kohlberg viewed the habitualized
virtue approach of character education as intellectually 
devoid, and of no use when one faces real-life dilemmas
which have no antecedent in the actor’s prior training [6]. 
Kohlberg’s theory of moral development laid out six 
developmental stages of moral judgment in which persons 
construct increasingly complex understandings of moral
cooperation within complex social structures [7,8]. His six
stages of development were later grouped into three levels of
reasoning: pre-conventional, conventional, and post-
conventional.  In pre-conventional reasoning (Stages 1 & 2),
moral judgment is based on the formation of practical
agreements between interested parties to meet the 
individualistic, ego-centric goals without regard to the norms 
or expectations of the larger social group [9].  This is the  
level typically seen in pre-adolescent children. In 
conventional reasoning (Stages 3 & 4), the actor’s needs and 
desires are subordinated to the norms and conventions of 
society.  The value of equality before the law, even for 
unknown citizens, becomes uppermost in the individual’s
moral thinking, and so this level is often seen as the ‘law and 
order’ level.  In the final level of development, post-
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conventional reasoning (Stages 5 & 6), the individual
recognizes that laws and conventions are to be defended
only to the extent that they serve a morally justifiable end.
In Kohlberg’s view, it is at this level (specifically stage 6)
that one develops justice-based reasoning that transcends 
convention, and a universal sense of moral obligation 
emerges.
The net effect of Kohlberg’s theoretical innovation was to 
create two camps for moral development research: those that
held the Aristotelian view that moral growth involved 
acquisition of those virtues that allowed one to live the good
life, versus the Kohlbergian view that growth occurs as we
develop sophisticated cognitive abilities to apply internally 
derived moral principles.  From the Vietnam War era until
the last decade, Kohlberg’s theory of cognitive moral 
development has held sway and influenced the majority of
work in this area.  That would change as new research began 
to identify weaknesses in the theory. 
CLOSE BUT NO CIGAR: DECISION-MAKING IN DAILY LIFE
Despite the tremendous impact that Kohlberg’s theory has 
had on research in cognitive development and moral
education [10,11], it has lost much of its splendor in recent
years. Modern researchers have identified several 
weaknesses in Kohlberg’s theory, all of which point to a 
failure of the theory to predict how individuals grapple with
moral decisions in every day life.  
Perhaps most importantly is the fact that, when interviewed,
most adults cannot articulate their own decision-making 
processes [1].  This suggests that moral decision-making is 
not exclusively rational as both Kant and Kohlberg would
argue, for if it were, individual’s cognitive processes would
be highly salient and thus easily described by the
interviewee.  Instead there are non-cognitive, perhaps even 
habitual, aspects that people call on to deal with every day 
decisions. 
Another fundamental weakness in Kohlberg’s model is its
reliance on the idea that at earlier stages of development,
morality is based on social norms and the dictates of 
authority (Stages 3 & 4 in particular), it is only at the most
advanced stages that individuals reason autonomously from
social conventions and normative influences.  However, in
the work of Nucci [12] it has been made clear that both 
young children and adults, across cultures, maintain a 
separation between moral principles and social norms.  In 
Nucci’s study of children living in conservative religious
communities (Amish, Dutch reform Calvinist, Orthodox
Jews, etc.) most children said it was acceptable for people to 
act in ways considered wrong in their religion (e.g. for
women to lead worship or not wearing head covering during
worship) if there were no prescription against such acts in
scripture.  However, nearly 80% of children still thought it
would be wrong for an individual to violate such basic moral
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principles as telling the truth and avoiding harm to others 
even if the scriptures said nothing on the subject.  From this
research it was concluded that despite Kohlberg’s insistence 
to the contrary, human beings do distinguish between social 
conventions and moral principles even at points in their life 
when they are at Kohlberg’s lowest developmental stages. 
There are, of course, other weaknesses of the model.  Blasi
for instance noted that numerous studies of moral and
immoral behavior showed weak links between moral
judgment stage and moral behavior; implying that while
moral judgment may be a key determinant to the formation 
of a moral intention, it is certainly not the only determinant
[13-15].  Subsequent research has also shown that
individuals do not progress through Kohlberg’s stages in a 
perfectly uniform manner as was initially predicted, but
rather wax and wane between stages as they transition from 
one general cognitive framework to another [16].  And
lastly, significant research has shown in recent years that
moral emotions, such as empathy and sympathy, can play as 
important a role as reason in moral decision-making [17,18].
In short, Kohlberg’s theory, while crucially important in
moving psychology from the behaviorist mind-set of
character education to a developmental perspective, is now a
fading model for understanding how human’s grow in the 
moral domain. 
ONCE MORE INTO THE BREECH: SCHEMA THEORY AND 

MORAL EXPERTISE
 
As was noted earlier, a key criticism of Kohlberg’s theory is
that most of our cognitive activity is not conscious and
deliberate, but is rather “tacit, implicit, and automatic” [19].
In light of this reality, a new moral psychology has recently
emerged based on schema theory. 
Schema theory, which is derived from social-cognitive 
psychology, is an attempt to view daily human interactions
from the perspective of information-processing.  Schemas 
are knowledge structures that reside in our long-term 
memory, ready to be invoked should the necessary stimuli 
be presented.  They are developed through our experiences 
and interactions with others, and modified based on our 
recognition of the consequences of invoking certain schema
in certain situations.  In short, schema are the mental
instruction pamphlets we use for every day interactions.
Recently, Narvaez [1,2] has argued from the schema theory 
position that moral decision-making involves both the 
“deliberative mind”, which relies on conscious reasoning, 
and the “intuitive mind”, which involves unconscious 
invocation of mental schema.  The intuitive mind in this
framework is aligned with empirical evidence of moral 
decision-making in every day life, while the deliberative 
mind plays the role of challenging our pre-conceptions and
guides development of the intuitive mind.  The deliberative 
mind represents the sort of rational cognitive effort 
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emphasized by the Kohlbergian tradition.  The intuitive 
mind, however, is more akin to the Aristotelian notion of
“habit”.  It seems that perhaps what Aristotle meant by
habituation was not behavioral modification through rote
repetition, but rather engagement in regular moral acts
followed by reflection such that we have the opportunity to 
modify our moral schema and enhance their automaticity.
And so through schema theory we seem to have united the 
two competing views of moral education: reasoning-based 
vs. virtue-based.  Schema theory argues that a person lacking 
either the intuitive mind of daily decision-making or the 
deliberative mind of rational thought is an incomplete moral 
person.  If in fact we use schema to intuitively address moral 
decisions in daily life, and in the longer term use our 
reasoning to challenge these intuitions, then it seems there 
ought to be some people that are better prepared for moral
decision-making.  We might say there are individuals that 
have the attribute of moral expertise.  In the general sense, 
experts have more content and process knowledge, and their 
knowledge is better organized than novices.  They have 
more developed intuitive senses of a problem and how and
when to apply reasoning to the problem.
Given this depiction, Narvaez [2] has argued that moral
ability can also be treated as a form of expertise.  She 
suggests that moral exemplars contain expertise in one or
more processes essential to moral behavior: ethical
sensitivity, ethical judgment, ethical focus, and ethical 
action.  Experts in ethical sensitivity are better able to
recognize a moral situation, to understand their role in the 
situation, and to take the perspective of others involved in 
the situation.  Experts in ethical judgment “reason about
duty and consequences, and apply personal and religious
codes to solve complex problems” [2], and we might add to
this ‘professional codes’.  Experts in ethical focus are better 
able to regulate their priorities over the long-term in a way
that reflects a deep commitment to moral and ethical values. 
Finally, an expert in ethical action demonstrates the ability
to focus on the end goal of carrying out a moral intention 
and has the courage to do so. 
The concept of moral expertise is of little value if we do not 
use it to help us envision ways of moving individuals from
the novice to the expert state.  From the schema theory 
perspective we would argue that novices require study both 
in the intuitive aspects of expertise and the deliberative 
aspects.  The student of moral expertise would require 
simultaneous exposure to highly contextualized moral
situations for the intuitive mind and focused reflection on
moral theory for the deliberative mind.
SEEKING ANSWERS WITH MODERN SCIENCE:
 
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND NEUROBIOLOGY
 
Our understanding of how the human mind processes moral
situations based on schema theory and moral expertise may 
provide us with great insight. However, it fails to explain
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the source of our moral being. Nor does it explain why 
people should have such differing perspectives on what
constitutes moral (or immoral) behavior.  For this we must 
turn to evolutionary psychology and neurobiology.
Nucci’s discovery of universal notions of basic moral
concepts among young children suggests that morality is
based on our evolutionary history as a species [20]. 
Evolution seems to have prepared us with the ability to 
recognize distress in others and to respond with empathy.
Even infants have the ability to express anguish and to 
recognize it in the face of their mothers. Evolution seems to 
form our earliest moral schema, which are subsequently 
modified by incorporation of early experiences and feelings
[21].  These emotional tags become the motivational triggers 
for accessing appropriate moral schema in later life. As 
cognitive skills develop, we regulate the role of emotions in
our moral schema and intuitively apply reason to decision-
making, though emotions continue to play an essential part
in the intuitive aspects of moral decision-making.  Thus, 
moral education must incorporate both affective and 
cognitive aspects of development. 
Evolutionary psychology and neurobiology also give us
direction in understanding why individuals should have
different motivations for moral decision-making and
behavior.  Once again, Narvaez is at the forefront in 
proposing a new model of ethics called Triune Ethics Theory
in which she argues that it is the limbic system within the 
brain that governs use of moral schema and information
processing [2].
The central argument of this theory is that rather than 
rejecting some self-identities as moral and others as 
immoral, Triune Ethics Theory sees all self-identities as 
inherently moral – it assumes that all humans strive to be
good and at some inherent level are. Differences in
individual’s moral perspectives, therefore, are based more on
the type of moral identity that people form for themselves, 
rather than on the degree of its moral validity.  Narvaez, 
inspired by the work of MacLean [22], has identified three 
evolutionary ethics that help us to define different moral 
identity types: the ethic of security, the ethic of engagement,
and the ethic of imagination. The ethic of security is based 
on the most primitive aspects of the limbic system and is the 
dominant mental structure in reptiles.  It is associated with
emotions of survival and thriving including fear, anger, and
sexuality.  In humans it manifests itself in qualities of self-
protection, autonomy, status enhancement, and in-group 
loyalty.  Individuals ensconced in this ethic often take a
‘might-makes-right’ orientation toward moral decision-
making, emphasize control of the emotions, and see out-
group members as weak and less deserving. We might
equate this ethic with Kohlberg’s pre-conventional reasoning 
levels; however, here the ethic is unconscious and based on
tacit and automatic information processing rather than
rational thought.  As all humans contain this most
Session S4H 
fundamental neural structure, its influence can only be 
minimized when we sense that our emotional and physical 
security is intact within a given environment.  If we feel at 
all threatened, this ethic will present itself. 
The second ethic, the ethic of engagement, is based on 
emotional systems that encourage us to interact with one
another, procreate, and care for the young, ill, and elderly.
An individual who creates for herself a moral identity of
engagement will have more affinity and capacity for 
meaningful relationships and a stronger commitment to help
those in need.
The final ethic is that of the imagination, based on the more 
recently evolved prefrontal cortex.  Within this structure the
mind integrates the self-preservation identity of the ethic of
security and the relatedness of the ethic of engagement.  On
the one hand it seeks to subdue the instinctual need for 
safety and security [23], while simultaneously assigning 
attributions to the intentions and actions of others [24].  It
serves the role of making sense of the external actions of 
others without awareness of their internal motives or 
decision-making processes.  But it does not act alone.  If our
identity is strongly influenced by the ethic of security we are 
likely to attribute the actions of others as aggressive attempts 
to threaten our status.  If, however, we identify with the ethic 
of engagement we may see these same actions as attempts to
form relationships and/or seek help.  The ways in which 
these three ethics interact within our brain play a 
fundamental role in our moral outlook. 
It is important to recognize that the ethic of security is our 
default identity as self-preservation comes before all other 
needs.  Only through proper attention and nurturing during
our development can we attain the proper neuro-circuitry to
allow us to operate within the ethic of engagement and
imagination [24,25].  This would explain why children who
are raised in emotionally and/or physically abusive homes
struggle to move beyond an ethic of security – their identity
is bound up within their own self-preservation for good 
reason.  And so we as educators have a responsibility to
create safe environments and caring relationships for our 
students if we are to see them achieve their full human
capability. 
A HOLISTIC FRAMEWORK: CARE AND REASON UNITE
Humans have a more complete understanding of their moral
functioning and development than ever.  This understanding
would be of little practical value if it were not put to the task 
of better educating people to be ethical.  To this end Narvaez 
has proposed a series of steps for ethical education referred
to as Integrative Ethical Education (IEE) [3].
Step 1: Establish caring relationships with each student
As discussed previously, the human brain is evolutionarily
primed for emotional engagement.  Without this sort of
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interaction, our ethic of security becomes dominant and our
moral outlook is one of self-preservation and might-makes­
right.  With the appropriate affection from caregivers and 
teachers, and a safe environment in which to learn, children 
can develop the ethic of engagement.  It is no surprise then
that when students report having caring relationships with
their teachers, they exhibit higher motivation and 
achievement.  Focusing on the importance of respectful, 
caring relationships between student and teacher is at the 
heart of current thinking in feminist pedagogy [26].  Truly 
caring relationships strip away power differentials, meaning 
that all actors in a classroom are learners – there is no 
individual source of authority.  Engineering education has 
made some moves in this direction with student-centered
learning pedagogies, but there is much more to be done in
this arena. 
Step 2: Establish a climate of achievement and character
Caring classrooms are not simply places of emotional 
support.  They additionally promote high achievement
among students and support their moral identity formation. 
This requires that students be involved in the social life of
the classroom and/or school.  This can be accomplished by
providing students with greater autonomy, using student-
centered pedagogy that promotes self-directed learning, and 
allowing students to influence teacher decisions.  It also 
means allowing students to interact with one another and to
discuss course content and policies.  For teachers it means
providing a safe environment in which students can 
occasionally falter in their moral growth. 
Step 3: Teach ethical skills across the curriculum using a
novice-to-expert pedagogy
To become expert, individuals must develop both
deliberative and intuitive capacities in each of the four 
ethical skills sets described previously: ethical sensitivity, 
ethical judgment, ethical focus, and ethical action.  Narvaez 
has identified specific sub-skills within each of these four 
areas [18], all of which are inherent to either the ethic of 
engagement or the ethic of imagination, or both.  To activate 
the intuitive mind around these skills, students need
exposure to deeply contextual ethical situations, as well as, 
intentional role modeling by teachers.  The deliberative mind
is cultivated by providing theoretical explanation and 
opportunities for dialogue between novices and with experts. 
Recent moves to incorporate service-learning into 
engineering curricula is a promising move in the right
direction. We must also provide students with opportunities 
to informally and safely discuss professional ethical issues 
with faculty and moral experts. 
Step 4: Foster self-authorship and self-regulation 
Despite our best efforts as educators, at some point the 
decision to become a moral expert rests with the student. 
Those students who have developed the necessary skills of 
self-regulation will be better prepared to enlist the deliberate 
mind in identifying activities and environments in which the 
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moral schema implicit in the intuitive mind are most
enhanced.  It is this self-regulation that provides experts with
the ability to direct their own learning within their domain of
expertise.  As educators we can work with students to 
recognize the value of these specialized skills and practice 
their implementation. We can also strive to make self-
regulation an explicit educational objective within our 
curricula and assessment strategies. 
Step 5: Building communities and coordinating development 
systems
It would be unwise to think that our responsibility to prepare 
students for a life of moral expertise ends at the door of our 
classrooms.  The purpose of moral education, after all, is to 
prepare students to live a moral life within their 
communities.  If we truly believe in preparing students to
participate in, nurture, and strengthen democratic values
within society, then it would seem that the school
community within which they learn these values must also 
reflect and engage in these same values. This means
empowering all members of a community – students, 
teachers/faculty, and administrators.  Our leaders must 
model ethical decision-making, encourage students to 
openly challenge their decisions, and carefully nurture this
delicate process.  This will be a particularly difficult task in 
engineering education with its culture of convergent, 
homogenous thinking as compared to the liberal arts where 
more divergent thought is encouraged.
PHILOSOPHY STRIKES BACK: IMPLICATIONS FOR 

ENGINEERING EDUCATION
 
Over the years, numerous changes to engineering curricula
and pedagogy have been suggested as paths to improved
engineering ethics education.  We could spend many pages 
here discussing these and proposing yet new approaches. 
We could take all the psychological theories posited within
this paper and others, and derive new, innovative approaches 
to helping our students become better ethical decision-
makers.  And yet as I conclude this paper on the psychology
of human morality, it occurs to me that what is really needed 
in engineering education is first a re-examination of our
moral identity as a discipline.  No amount of pedagogical
innovation is going to change the ethical capacity of our
students if we do not first address the question at the core of 
all human growth: “Who am I and who am I going to be?”
College is a time when identity formation is particularly
strong, and the signals that we send will have long-lasting 
effects on our students.  College communities have a 
responsibility to help guide students as they struggle with
these questions.  And so the most fundamentally important
task that we as educators must undertake is to seriously
question who we are, and what we have become as a 
discipline. If we can do this, and model that sort of moral
identity, we will go a long way to improving the ethics
education of our students. 
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What I have suggested here is no simple task.  Engineering
and engineering education hold deeply entrenched views of
the world, and there is little real diversity of thought within 
the discipline.  The overwhelmingly masculine orientation of
the engineering profession has meant that only certain voices 
within the discipline are heard.  The culture of engineering 
has driven our sense of what is ethically valued.  A quick 
look at typical codes of ethics makes clear their prescriptive 
nature and their strong orientation toward “rights” and 
justice-based reasoning.  Engineers perceive themselves as 
objective and separated from the context of the decision.  It
is non-relational, and we act in accordance with those 
actions which avoid harm to others – employers, clients, and 
to a somewhat lesser extent, society. 
Students receive the same views of the world that their 
faculty received when they were students.  The dominance
of certain ethics within engineering, therefore, is a result of
reinforced social schema that support certain models of a
good human life (rights and fairness) at the expense of
others (e.g. feminine caring-based ethics).  Engineering
faculty, for the most part, do not place an emphasis on a pro-
social ethos for engineering.  Imagine a discipline in which 
engineering students saw it as their responsibility to serve 
humanity much as doctors do. Imagine a discipline in which
the code of ethics stated not that the first duty of engineers 
was to protect the public welfare, but to proactively improve 
it. Imagine a discipline in which the world recognized 
engineers not as cogs within the corporate machine, but 
rather as leaders of non-governmental organizations that
sought to alleviate human suffering throughout the world.
Such a view of engineering is a possibility, but it is not our 
current reality.  We have become a vocationally oriented
discipline.  We tell prospective students about the great jobs
and salaries they can receive, not about the great problems
they can solve. We focus on the needs of industry, and not
on the needs of real people – look at our advisory boards.
We are as much to blame for this as anyone.  The various
psychological theories we have discussed in this paper tell us 
that as educators we exhibit traits that students assume to be
‘good’ and thus inculcate them.  But what if our own traits
do not support a good, flourishing human life? We must ask 
ourselves what it means to be a ‘good’ engineer and how we
exhibit these traits.  
Are we prepared to look at ourselves deeply? If not, little 
will change and we will miss the opportunity to help the 
human species survive into the 22nd century. 
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